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BOOK REVIEWS
LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS. By Lewis M. Simes. St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., Kansas City: Vernon Law Book Company. Vol. I,
pp. xv, 527; Vol. II, pp. xv, 556; Vol. III, pp. xv, 583.
Once in about every fifteen or twenty years the law in any par-
ticular field is rewritten, brought down to date. In the field of Future
Interests, Professor Gray produced the first notable treatise in this
country in 1886. He revised this work in 1906 and 1914. Kales'
treatise followed in 1920. Now we have a new treatment of the sub-
ject by Professor Simes, three volumes, very attractively bound and
printed in clear type to meet the demand of the most fastidious reader.
Professor Simes has wisely followed the old terminology, avoid-
ing the complications involved in an adoption of the Hohfeldian terms.
He has also recognized the fact that future interests cannot all be
treated in the same manner. Each requires some special treatment.
He has succeeded in making his propositions clear by the use of illus-
trative cases, much more so than the average writer of law books.
He does not hesitate to draw on the old authorities on this subject,
Coke, Blackstone and Fearne.
The author's excellent discussion of the tests for determining
whether a remainder is vested or contingent merits special mention.
The space devoted to the rule in Shelley's case may come as a surprise
to those who regard this rule as obsolete. It takes one of the longest
chapters in the three volumes to dispose of it in spite of the fact that
the rule has been abolished by statute in more than half of our states
and by judicial decision in many others. This, however, is not amiss
since it is necessary for a lawyer to have full knowledge of these early
rules of real property law if he is to understand our modern prop-
erty law.
The emphasis the author places on statutory changes, notably the
creation of new future interests by legislative enactment, is an im-
portant feature of the book and a real contribution.
Professor Simes would agree with Professor Gray in working out
the law of future interests in personalty on the analogy of real prop-
erty law, but he would study "the rights, privileges, powers and other
relations incident to these situations, rather than to apply in toto a
concept from another field of law which resembles in one or two par-
ticulars a future interest in personalty." He finds they differ in six
important aspects. He calls attention to the fact that the modern
tendency in dealing with personal property is to employ the device of
a trust.
In considering gifts in default of appointment and the relative
merits of a constructive trust and a gift by implication, the author
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does not fully bring out the advantages inherent in the latter theory,
especially in cases involving bona fide purchasers. Nor does he give
due consideration to fraudulent execution of powers, Section 290.
The reviewer regards those chapters dealing with construction to
be the most helpful and suggestive. The author's treatment of the
Rule against Perpetuities seems most disappointing. The discussion
of this rule raises the old controversy as to whether the rule is one
against restraints on alienation or one against remote vesting of title,
or a combination of the two. Professor Gray long and ably contended
for the view that the rule was against remote vesting only, and re-
garded the rule against restraints on alienation as a separate and dis-
tinct rule. His treatises on these rules have been the guiding influence
for many years and courts in this country have come to accept his view
for the most part. It seems unfortunate that one of our leading au-
thorities in this field should now apparently throw his influence against
this trend. It is not a move towards clearness to now regard the two
as one rule. The author's discussion of cases indeed, is confined almost
wholly to those of remote vesting of title.
Then too, the position the author takes in regard to Dunpor's
Case may surprise those familiar with the note-writer's comment in
12 Harvard Law Review 272, that "in America, the case has been rec-
ognized principally to be distinguished, and it seems unsupported by
a square decision on the same facts" and also Professor Kales' curt
dismissal of the doctrine in one very brief section. (Section 279,
Estates in Future Interests.)
The author's citation of law review articles is not as complete as
one might wish. No mention is made of many excellent articles. For
instance, his treatment of bare expectancies should have included ref-
erence to 32 Michigan Law Review 491. Also some cases cited to sup-
port propositions were not as carefully traced down in Shepard's
Citator as they should have been. An instance is to be found in Note
10 to Section 233, re Thompson's Estate, 26 S. D. 576, which was over-
ruled in Henrich v. Sewell, 59 S. D. 372.
Professor Simes' treatment of this technical subject is highly prac-
tical. It is not doctrinaire in the least. As far as possible the author
has worked out the rational bases of the rules and has not hesitated
to suggest what the probable trends will be in the future. This is the
present day authority in this field.
W. LEwis ROBERTS.
University of Kentucky
College of Law
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAv OF TRUSTS. By the American Law In-
stitute, 1935, pp. 6-vii-1024.
A technique for the reviewing of the fruits of the American Law
Institute has developed. This reviewer, however, believes a some-
what different type may be more useful to the practicing lawyers who
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may chance to read this review; hence, he does not propose to discuss
the virtues or possible vices of the plan of procedure followed by the
American Law Institute.
In the first place, this reviewer thinks the Restatement of Trusts
is made In more direct and understandable language than most of
the others he has had occasion to study. To those lawyers who have
not yet seen either the finished product or the preliminary drafts it
will be of interest to state that the restatement of trusts is divided
into twelve chapters: Definitions and Distinctions, Creation, The
Trust Property, The Trustee, The Beneficiary, The Transfer of the
Interest of the Beneficiary, Administration, Liabilities to Third Per-
sons, Liabilities of Third Persons, Termination and Modification,
Charitable Trusts, and Resulting Trusts. The subject of Constructive
Trusts being regarded as a phase of the law of Unjust Enrichment is
not treated here, but is transferred to an entirely different restatement,
that of Unjust Enrichment, hitherto known by the generic name
"quasi-contracts". It is obviously impossible to review in detail these
various chapters, containing as they do a total of 460 sections.
The treatise may be said to express general principles rather than
applied rules, and in the long run that will probably be its great merit,
though the practitioner would undoubtedly often wish to find the pre-
cise rule of law declared, whereas instead of finding it he is obliged
to deduce it from a declared principle and must thereafter convince
the court of the correctness of his deduction. But the degree of gen-
erality versus precise application varies and the reporter doubtless
would not claim a high degree of consistency in that respect. Thus,
the chapter on Administration of the Trust contains inter alia sections
dealing with the interests of successive beneficiaries and especially
with the apportionment of income and of receipts from shares of stock.
The detailed rules as well as the general principles from which they
are deduced are given. In general the Massachusetts rule and also
the Kentucky rule are rejected and the Pennsylvania rule principally,
largely as modified and developed by the experience of the New York
courts, is adopted. This is an exceedingly successful blending of prin-
ciple and rule and it would be hard to think of a case where the ques-
tion of the apportionment of the income from stock arises that could
not readily be allocated to the proper section and subsection.
Extended comments follow the more important and involved sec-
tions which tend to assist the inquirer who may be in doubt as to just
what section is applicable to his problem. The illustrations are very
general throughout the comment material and they are merely
suggestive.
Comment might have been made on various matters, which has
not been made. Thus, one must look elsewhere for help if he is con-
cerned with litigation between co-trustees. Nor is there much said
about where the duties of an executor end and those of the trustee
begin in those cases where the same person or persons are appointed to
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both offices, without specific directions. So in the case of trusts estab-
lished by will, there is not much help with respect to the question
just where the functions of the probate court end and those of the
equity court begin, nor the effect of a joint bond given by co-trustees
and whether it varies their common law liability. Such matters in-
volve details which might or might not be brought within the scope
of section or comment, depending upon the judgment of the reporter,
and many border-line matters are not to be found here.
It seems impossible to select any one chapter or subject for spe-
cial comment on any sensible basis 6f selection. A recital of the topics
in each chapter and of the section headings and also even of comment
subdivisions would be illuminating to those who have not seen the
treatise but it would require overmuch space. This reviewer Is espe-
cially impressed with those sections dealing with what might be called
"who are purchasers for value of trust property". But other sections
are equally meritorious and similarly enlightening. He does not be-
lieve that the humblest lawyer can afford to proceed without consult-
ing it. There is both a complete table of contents and an adequate
index.
ALvrr E. Ev ns.
N-uTRALruy: ITS IxSTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW. Vol. II, The
Napoleonic Period by W. Alison Phillips and Arthur H. Reede; Vol. III,
The World War Period by Edgar Turlington; Vol. IV, Today and To-
morrow by Philip C. Jessup, New York City, Columbia University
Press, 1936.
In the first volume of this noteworthy series Professors Deak and
Jessup traced the origins and early development of the law of neu-
trality. The three succeeding volumes carry the study through to the
present, concluding with an examination of the future status of
neutrality.
The second volume, which deals with the Napoleonic Period, is
divided into two parts. In the first part Professor Phillips of Dublin
University analyzes the conflict between belligerents and neutrals
throughout this important period for the development of this branch of
international law. In the second part Mr. Reede seeks an answer to
the interesting and highly important question of the effects of war
upon neutral commerce and industry. He concludes that the Napole-
onic wars effected little "lasting change in economic conditions and
relationships", and that "for the most part, the economic situation of
the several neutral states in 1825 was pretty much what one would
have anticipated, had one projected the trends from 1750 to 1790." He
thus rejects the view invariably held by belligerents that neutrals
profit greatly from war.
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In the fourth volume Mr. Turlington attempts an assessment of
the losses which belligerent measures inflicted upon neutral commerce
in the World War and to strike a rough balance between neutral gains
and losses. He estimates the damages which resulted from belligerent
measures relating to contraband at $350,000,000. These losses fell first
of all upon shipowners and the owners of cargos, who, however, re-
covered their losses from insurance companies. Since the insurance
companies were prosperous, Turlington concludes that the bill for
losses and damages from these measures must have been ultimately
paid by consumers of goods and services. Neutral losses from block-
ades and analogous measures, which he estimates at nearly a billion
dollars, he believes were likewise ultimately borne by the consumer.
The very formidable losses which neutrals suffered from belligerent
interferences by sovereign right, which included such measures as ex-
port and import embargoes, bunker control and black lists, could not
be made with any approach to accuracy. Turlington ventures the
broad conclusion that "a general war of great magnitude brings in its
train a series of economic and financial dislocations so injurious to
the world as a whole that no amount of neutral prosperity suffices to
offset them."
Professor Jessup in the concluding volume undertakes the difficult
task of analyzing the present status of neutrality and of suggesting
lines of future policy. He asserts that neutrality far from being dead,
is still a vigorous, living institution, and that world peace may be
effectively advanced through neutrality. He suggests that the United
States join with other states in a collective or cooperative neutrality,
beased upon the principles of the Argentine Anti-War Pact. Professor
Jessup presses hard the case against the abandonment of neutrality;
indeed his ardor leads him to overstating the case. As an example
of this overstatement the following may be quoted:
"One hears constantly about the weakness and futility of interna-
tional law, particularly in time of war; inter arma leges silent . . .
Nevertheless, international law in time of war is not as useless as
some people suppose. The truth of this statement becomes apparent
if one envisages a situation in which the international law of bel-
ligerent and neutral rights is totally eliminated. In such a situation
a belligerent would be wholly free to use submarines or mines to sink
all vessels found anywhere on the seas or even in the territorial waters
off our coasts. If there were no such thing as the inviolability of
neutral territory, a belligerent would do us no wrong if it sent its
submarines into New York harbor and blew up ships at their docks
• . .". pp. 147, 148.
By what reason is this conclusion reached? The above would be
true only if all international law were abolished; it could not result
from the mere elimination of "the international law of belligerent and
neutral rights". With the elimination of the latter, states would still
be bound by the international law of peace, and under the law of peace
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none of the acts described are legal. Indeed it will be a blessed day
for neutrals when the extraordinary rights of belligerents are rooted
out of the law, where after all they have no logical place.
These four volumes constitute an exceedingly important and use-
ful contribution to the study of the origin, history and problem of neu-
trality. The series was well planned and soundly executed. The value
and significance of this notable work is of the very first order.
A. VANDENBOSH.
Professor of Political Science
University of Kentucky
THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY-A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, SUB-
STANCE AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY IN MODERN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW. By C. Reinold Noyes, New York-Toronto. Long-
mans, Green and Co., 1936, pp. xiv, 645.
A study of the institution of property from a "new viewpoint"-
institutional economics-really resolves itself into saying what has
been said before in a new terminology. We do not necessarily get new
ideas but we do get new ways of expressing old ones-after we have
learned the new vocabulary. The question naturally presents itself,
then, whether we are any better off after we have mastered the new
vocabulary. Measured by the test of utility, the Institution of Prop-
erty does not measure up. In this treatise the author departs from
the well beaten paths of the law to wander in the winding and hidden
ways of philology with the guide book of the behavioristic school to
direct him. The work, the author points out in his introduction, is an
attempt to supply a deficiency. "It is limited," he says, "in its scope
-to the purpose in hand; that is, to laying the necessary groundwork for
subsequent studies of the economics of the property system (financial
economics)."
To understand the "development, substance and arrangement" of
the system of Anglo-American property law, one must study the his-
tory of the Anglo-Saxon race step by step as that institution developed.
A study of the development of the Roman familia will help but little.
It simply cannot be revealed by a study of words, however learned
that study may be. Things come first, words after. The pursuit for
the derivation of those words will not necessarily explain the origin
or development of those things or institutions, as this attempt seems
to prove.
The author's introduction is in many respects the most interesting
part of his whole treatise. There is without doubt a sound basis for
the author's criticism of attempts to picture the earliest stages of
Roman civilization or any other, for that matter, for we have been
reading into it our views of the present or what we think it should
have been or what we think it must have been.
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There are sections of the work which the student of the law will
find of interest, especially those dealing with definitions of common
property terms like leases and estates; but the book as a whole can
make but little appeal to the lawyer.
W. LEwis ROBERTS.
University of Kentucky
College of Law
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS. RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF EquI-
TABLE INTERESTS ImPOSED BY THE TERnS OF THE TRUST OR BY STATUTE.
By Erwin Griswold. Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, N. Y. (1936), pp.
lxvi, 551.
There was an unquestioned need for a treatise on this narrow but
growing area of the law and that need has been supplied by an excel
lent book written in a clear and forcible manner. Some realization of
how exceedingly intricate the subject of Spendthrift Trusts is, makes
the author's accomplishment the more appreciated. One notes but a
few colloquialisms, e. g., the use of "quite",' "different ... than",2 the
position of "only".'
Though one is impressed with the thoroughness displayed through-
out, the reviewer was especially pleased with the presentation of the
so-called "Insurance Trusts", "Special Circumstances in which the
Interest of the Beneficiary May be Reached", and "Related Types of
Trusts". One may also note the criticism of the Wentworth case,' with
which criticism apparently Professor Powell disagrees' and the criti-
cism of Whittem ore v. Equitable Trust Co.,6 with which criticism it is
suspected that Powell also disagrees.
One or two criticisms, though of an entirely superficial character,
are perhaps in order. In Section 56 reference is made to the law of
certain states where the author declares that the question of the
validity of spendthrift trusts is substantially unaffected by statute.
Of these, four, including Kentucky, have denied its validity. This
statement is not wholly congruou , in the opinion of the reviewer, with
Section 184 where the Kentucky statute is quoted. This statute goes
back to the year 1796. It is identical with the corresponding former
Virginia statute which was in force in Kentucky until superseded by
local legislation. This statute is assuredly regarded by the Kentucky
bar and bench as directly and substantially affecting the validity of
spendthrift trusts within the commonwealth. The fullest possible
effect has not always been given to it, due partially at least, to two
I P. 241, line 3.
'P. 254, line 18.
'P. 164, line 5.
' 230 N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920).
'49 Harv. L. Rev. 1215 at 1217.
6250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
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causes. One is Kentucky's peculiarly liberal rule permitting so-called
reasonable restraints upon the alienation even of legal estates, and the
other has been the difficulty of levying upon or attaching equitable
interests in land.
Did the author pass over an excellent opportunity to expose the
futility of the Olaflin doctrine in sections 512-3? It is largely futile
because after alienation of his interest by the beneficiary, there is no
further purpose of the settlor to be served. Possibly it has some eco-
nomic or moral or psychological utility in that a transfer by the bene-
ficiary of his interest is likely to bring less than its proper value. This,
together with the disapproval of the settlor, may conceivably operate
as some deterrent to alienations. In Section 443 the author points
out that a gift in trust for A, his wife and children or for A and his
family does not create a separable interest in A, which can be reached
by A's creditors. The Kentucky cases fully sustain this view. The
author accordingly might well have suggested this device in Section
583, which contains proposed Kentucky forms.
Professor Powell' disagrees with Professor Griswold's criticism
of Hull v. Farmers Loan and Trust 00.8 In that case the corpus of a
certain trust fund was to be paid to testator's son "whenever my said
son shall become financially solvent and able to pay all his just debts
and liabilities from resources other than the principal of this trust
fund". It was held that the interest of the son did not pass to his
trustee in bankruptcy. The reviewer finds it difficult to disagree with
Powell. Any other view would seem to make the condition precedent
entirely nugatory.
One can hardly complain that the author did not add citations that
he might have added. Thus Webster v. Busl" overruled in Carpenter
v. Carpenter"O illustrates the type of extrinsic evidence offered with
respect to its bearing upon the intentions of the settlor and might
have been cited in section 425, note 12. So in section 16 where re-
straints on legal interests are discussed, mention thight have been
made sof the peculiar position sometimes accorded to arrears of
alimonyu
The discussion of the future of the spendthrift trust is illumi-
nating. Professor Gray thought there was a touch of socialism in it.
The author suggests the origin is to be found in the individualism of
the pioneer. He does not refer to the Kantian teaching as to the end of
law, that of giving the fullest possible effect to the individual will,
which prevailed so strongly here during the nineteenth century (save
'49 Harv. L. Rev. 1215 at 1217.
8245 U. S. 312 (1917).
'19 K. L. R. 565, 39 S. W. 411, 42 S. W. 1124 (1897).
- 119 Ky. 582, 81 S. W. 919 (1905).
'Vanness v. Ransom, 215 N. Y. 557, 109 N. E. 593 (1915). Cf. the
Washington rule that community property is not liable for the separate
torts of the husband, Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634
(1917)
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as it is coincident with the individualism of the pioneer), nor does
he suggest that soon after the date of Miller's opinion in Nicholas v.
Eaton,' a collectivist trend is observable in economic thought. Thus,
the year 1388 sees the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, which
marks a step in the development of the idea of a recognizable social
interest in the use of private property. Paradoxically this development
looks in the same direction as pioneer individualism and the doctrine
of free self-assertion. The author does give emphasis to a possible third
factor, the great man influence in legal history.n
With irresistible logic it is shown that there is no sufficient rea-
son why a settlor may not use the device of the spendthrift trust for
his own benefit, as well as for the benefit of others. It is difficult to
see a distinction between the two methods of creation economically or
socially. The fine article of the late Professor Costigan, who recently
reexamined the whole problem," is cited with approval. Would it be
too revolutionary to suggest that some time in the future we may have
cause to reexamine the foundations of the rule respecting restraints
on the alienation of legal interests?
Arvnq E. EvANs.
- 91 U. S. 716 (1876).
23 Sec. 29, but it was not Mr. Justice Field who wrote the opinion.
11 Those Protective Trusts which are Called "Spendthrift Trusts"
Re-Examined, 22 Cal. L. Rev. 471 (1934).

